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Consent to Surgical Procedures
Carl E. Wasmuth, M. D.*
C ASE LAW RELATING TO SURGICAL consent is fairly well settled.
A review of the numerous decisions on this question can be
summed up with a general statement: If the patient freely con-
sults the physician,' understands the operation contemplated,
enters the hospital, and submits to the operation, consent is im-
plied.2 This consent to a surgical operation is a privilege that the
patient extends to the surgeon to commit trespass to the person.3
* Dr. Wasmuth is a Member of the Staff in the Department of Anesthe-
siology of The Cleveland Clinic Foundation. He holds degrees of Bachelor
of Science and of Doctor of Medicine, both from University of Pittsburgh.
He is a Fellow of the American College of Anesthesiology, a Diplomate of
the American Board of Anesthesiology, and a second year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School.
'Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
"A patient who voluntarily consults a surgeon and voluntarily submits
himself for treatment, relying entirely upon the surgeon's skill and care to
decide for him what shall be done gives a general consent by implication
at least, to such operation as may be reasonably necessary."
Pratt v. Davis, 224 11. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann.
Cas. 197 (1906).
2 Held that if a patient voluntarily submits to a dangerous surgical opera-
tion, his consent will be presumed unless he is the victim of a false and
fraudulent representation; and the burden of proof upon the question of
consent is not, therefore, on the surgeon performing the operation.
State to Use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382, 2 L. R, A.
587, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340 (1889).
See also, McClallen v. Adams, 19 (Pick.) Mass. 333, 31 Am. Dec. 140
(1937);
King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922);
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931);
Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W. 2d 7 (1944);
Higby v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932);
Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pena. 305, 16 A. 2d 15 (1940).
"There is no law or statute requiring that signed written authorization
be procured from a patient and his spouse preliminary to the performance
of an operation and it is not illegal to perform such an operation without
first procuring such a signed consent."
Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P. 2d 1095 (1954).
3 ... and it is settled general rule that in the absence of emergency or un-
anticipated conditions, a physician or surgeon must first obtain the consent
of the patient, if he is competent to give it, or someone legally authorized
to give it for him before treating or operating on him."
Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931). And see
Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92
(1914).
".... and a surgical operation on the body of a person is a technical bat-
tery or trespass unless he or some authorized person consented to it."
Pratt v. Davis, 222 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906). And see
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One of the basic rights extended to everyone under the com-
mon law is freedom from intentional touching of his person.
4 Of
course, there are numerous unavoidable trespasses which are a
product of modern life. Unintentional touching such as that oc-
curring in a crowded bus or elevator must be expected in our
turbulent modern existence. 5 In the casual intercourse of decent
society, grasping a friend's arm to attract his attention, although
intentional, does not involve a personal indignity. When getting
a haircut or having clothes fitted, the touching of the person is
intentional but consent is implied. Somewhere beyond these
examples, however, intentional touching becomes a battery. It is
little wonder that hospital administrators and surgeons exercise
such meticulous care to assure the obtaining of authorization for
operation before the patient reaches the surgical theater. It
would be a stroke of imaginative genius to visualize a more
violent trespass to the sanctity of the person than the unper-
mitted contact of the surgeon's scalpel or the anesthesiologist's
syringe of Pentothal.6
One court stated: "It is a fact that to anesthetize a human
being, to deprive him of consciousness outright, is to take a con-
siderable step along the road to killing him." Granted that this
is a dim view of the anesthesiologist's abilities and the patient's
chances of survival, it serves as an excellent example of the way
a court may scrutinize the physician's activities, especially if
they are carried out without the consent of the patient.
7
Express consent is not always essential, but may be implied
or presumed. A patient who voluntarily consults a surgeon and
voluntarily submits himself to treatment, relying entirely upon
the surgeon's skill and care, gives general consent, by implica-
(Continued from preceding page.)
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439(1905);
Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363, 53 A. L. R. 1052 (1927).
4 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 82 (2d ed., 1955).
5 Wiffin v. Kincaid, 2 Bos. & PNR 471 (1807);
Coward v. Baddleley, 4 Hur. & Nor. 478 (1859);
McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 S. 742, 30 A. L. R. 194 (1922)
(boxing);
Gibeline v. Smith, 106 Mo. App. 545, 80 S. W. 961 (1904) (friendly
scuffle); Note, 14 Univ. Cincinnati L. R. 161 (1940).
6 From personal experience.
7 Hawkins, W. G., Medicolegal Hazards of Anesthesia, 163 J. Amer. Med.
Assn., 746 (March 2, 1957).
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tion at least, to such operations as may be reasonably necessary.8
When a preoperative diagnosis has not been established, it is ac-
cepted surgical practice to perform an explorative operation in
order to identify the disease process. In these cases the question
often arises as to the legality of radical surgical maneuvers for
attempted cures. In cases of malignant tumors in the abdomen, it
frequently is necessary to remove entire organs and to radically
alter the mechanics of others. If the patient understands the
operative procedure, the surgeon acts as his agent and decides
for him what shall be done when the true nature of the disease
is disclosed." The patient under general anesthesia is unable to
grant express consent, but his submission to general anesthesia
presupposes that he relies entirely upon the surgeon's skill and
judgment. However, such implied consent is extended only to
8 41 Am. Jur. 109;
Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann. Cas.
197 (1906);
State to Use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Mo. 162, 16 A. 382, 2 L. R. A.
587, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340 (1889).
A surgeon having full power of control over the hospital nurse adminis-
tering anesthesia to a patient operated on by a surgeon is bound to exercise
such reasonable care and skill respecting administration thereof as is
usually exercised by average physicians and surgeons of good standing in
the same community as that in which he practices.
Jackson v. Joyner, 236 No. Car., 257, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1953). And see
O'Brien v. Cunard S. S., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N. E. 266, 13 L. R. A. 329
(1891);
Decenzo v. Berg, 340 Penna. 305, 16 A. 2d 15 (1940);
Barfield v. S. Highlands Inf., 191 Ala. 553, 68 S. 30 (1915);
Knowles v. Blue, 209 Ala. 27, 95 S. 491 (1923);
Thebault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N. E. 2d 349, 158 A. L. R. 613
(1945).
9 "A general direction to a surgeon authorizing him to operate for the cure
of a specific physical condition not only authorizes such operation but also
authorizes the surgeon to diagnose the case to ascertain for himself the
exact cause of the patient's illness and to make preliminary exploratory in-
cisions which may be necessary for that purpose."
Pratt v. Davis, supra, n. 8. And see
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1923) (Voluntary submission
gives implied consent);
Harrison v. Reid, 21 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 206, 290 D. N. P. 399 (1916).
Contra-
Messlander v. Armstrong, 90 Nebr. 774, 134 N. W. 922 (1912).
".... unauthorized removal of fascia from thigh in order to afford sheath-
ing for the tendons of the finger, could not be justified upon the theory of
an emergency since the primary operation on the patient's finger was in
no sense a major one."
Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 68 (1930).
"No rule or principle of law (which) would extend to him free license
respecting surgical operation."
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 263, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, 111
Am. St. Rep. 462, 5 An. Case, 303 (1905);
Paulson v. Gunderson, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N. W. 448 (1935).
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that surgeon whom the patient has consulted, and it is upon that
surgeon that the law casts the responsibilities of the agency. 10
It is generally held that surgical consent is rather general
authorization." When the surgeon in the course of an operation
(to which the patient has consented) discovers a condition not
anticipated, good medical judgment may dictate its correction if
possible. This condition, to fall within the consent authorization,
however, must be one that endangers the life or health of the
patient. Only in such situations is the surgeon justified in ex-
tending the surgical procedure. 12 The law in effect assumes that
the patient desires all necessary treatment in the judgment of
the surgeon. However, there are limits, past which the surgeon
exceeds the patient's consent. An authorization for a minor op-
eration ordinarily does not justify performing a major operation 3
that involves risks or results not previously contemplated: this
definitely would not be the operation described to the patient
10 "... . he constitutes the surgeon his agent to decide for him what shall be
done.... the surgeon whom the patient himself selected alone fills the re-
quirements (as his agent), and hence upon him the law should cast the
responsibilities of this ofice by the legal implication that the patient in-
tended him to act for him when he had made no other selections."
Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
"Now with anesthesia, the law will by implication constitute such sur-
geon the representative pro hac vice of his patient."
Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
1 Bennan v. Parsonnet, supra, n. 10.
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931);
Rathe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W. 2d 7 (1944);
Higby v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932).
12 Delahunt v. Fenton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. W. 168 (1928);
Bennett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (Mun. App. D. C., 1943).
The law should encourage self-reliant surgeons to whom patients may
safely entrust their bodies, and hence the law does not insist that the sur-
geon shall perform every operation according to plans and specifications in
advance by patient.
Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956).
".... that if in the course of the operation to which the patient has con-
sented, the physician discovers a condtion not anticipated before the opera-
tion commenced, and which if not removed will endanger life or health of
the patient, he is, though no express consent be obtained, justified in ex-
tending the operation to remove and overcome such conditions."
King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270, 26 A. L. R. 1032 (1922).
1 "Authorization for a minor operation ordinarily does not justify the
performing of a major operation which involves risks of results of a kind
not contemplated."
Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann.
Cas. 197 (1906). And see
Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363, 53 A. L. R. 1052 (1927);
Rotater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 880 (1913);
Zoterell v. Ripp, 187 Mich. 319, 153 N. W. 692 (1915).
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preoperatively. For example, a surgeon may not, on the basis of
an unrelated authorization, remove fascia from the thigh in order
to repair tendons of the fingers 14 unless it had been explained to
the patient that such a secondary operation would be necessary.
The lawyer at once recognizes the hesitancy of the courts to per-
mit an injury to an otherwise healthy part of the body in the
treatment of another unrelated diseased condition. Consent
obtained under fraud or deceit is not valid.1
5
The majority of cases in which the plaintiff charges the sur-
geon with exceeding consent involve castration.16 Either the male
has a hernia repaired and loses a testicle, or, a woman consents
to removal of her appendix and loses her ovary, tube, uterus, or
a combination thereof. Although it is difficult to conceive what
set of surgical circumstances during repair of a hernia would
require castration of the male, there are numerous cases relating
to repair of inguinal hernias where the testicle was sacrificed in
the procedure. Before an exploratory operation on the female,
the surgeon should explain to the woman that it might be neces-
sary to remove some of the generative organs. Some women
absolutely refuse to consent to removal of any of the reproductive
system even if diseased, and possession of both testicles may be
a fetish to a virile male. It behooves all surgeons to explain fully
to the patient the intended surgical procedure when it involves
removal of generative organs.
It is a well-settled general rule that in the absence of emer-
gency or extraordinary conditions, a surgeon first must obtain the
consent of the patient or someone legally authorized to give it for
him. A surgical operation without consent is a technical battery
or trespass. If a surgeon operates on the wrong patient, he has
operated without consent.1 7 If the patient specifically prohibits
the physician from removing any bone, and he does remove
bone which in his judgment should be removed, he operates with
14 Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 68 (1930).
15 Hobbs v. Kizur, 150 C. C. A. 13, 236 F. 681 (C. C. A., N. M., 1916);
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931).
16 Edwards v. Roberts, 12 Ga. App. 140, 76 S. E. 1054 (1913).
Mokart v. Ziemer, 67 Calif. App. 363, 227 P. 683 (1924) (removed the
right testicle during a hernia repair and held liable for malpractice).
17 41 Am. Jur. 221;
Samuelson v. Taylor, 160 Wash. 369, 295 P. 113 (1931).
18 Rotater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
Against the express instructions of the patient, the surgeon removed
bone from a diseased toe.
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no consent.' 8 A most horrifying situation that confronts a surgeon
is the disclosure on a postoperative roentgenogram of an instru-
ment or gauze sponge remaining in the abdomen. If he should
operate a second time to rectify this error and to. retrieve the
foreign body, without first advising the patient of the situation
and obtaining the patient's consent, the surgeon commits a tres-
pass.1 9
The so-called strict jurisdictions have adopted the philosophy
that no rule or principle of law extends to the physician free
license respecting surgical operations. It is said that these juris-
dictions restrict surgical endeavors to those to which the patient
has specifically consented. From the medical viewpoint it is
difficult to imagine how the cases could have been decided any
other way. The courts in most of these instances have rendered
decisions consistent with good medical judgment. It might be
presumed that the patient expected treatment consistent with
good medical practice.
The classic example used to illustrate a decision of the juris-
diction of strict interpretation is Mohr v. Williams.20 The patient
entered the hospital for an operation on her right ear, but while
she was under general anesthesia the surgeon discovered that
the left ear was involved to a greater degree. After consultation
with the family physician, who was present in the operating room,
the surgeon decided to operate on the left ear. The court found
that the surgeon exceeded his consent. It is evident from the
few facts presented that an adequate preoperative survey had
not been done. A complete examination of both ears was the least
to be expected before the patient was anesthetized and operated
upon. The decision therefore does limit the consent, but it may
have been the means to a just legal end.
The general rule that a surgeon operates at his peril without
first obtaining the consent of the patient21 or of someone lawfully
authorized to consent for him, is qualified in most courts in cases
of emergencies or of unanticipated conditions involving preserva-
19 Gist v. French, 288 P. 2d 1003 (Calif., 1955). And see
Delahunt v. Fenton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. W. 168 (1928).
Held that the surgeon had implied consent to operate upon the patient
to extract a bougie which had become lodged in the patient's bladder.
20 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 263, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, 111
Am. St. Rep. 462, 5 Ann. Cas. 303 (1905).
"If a patient consents to submit to a particular operation, he thereby
enters into a contract authorizing his physician to operate to the extent
of the consent given, but no further."
21 41 AM. JUr. 222.
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tion of life or health of the patient, when it is impractical first to
obtain consent to the operation or to the treatment which the
surgeon deems necessary.2 2 Some courts have held that consent
is implied, or that the existence of an emergency may justify
operating without consent. Other courts have held that the con-
sent is not implied, but that the surgeon is reasonably privileged
because he is reasonably entitled to assume that the patient
would consent. In fact, the surgeon in an emergency is privileged
to operate although the patient objects. It is well settled that in
case of emergency a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his
duty to perform, with or without the consent of the patient,
23
such operation as good surgical practice demands. In doing so,
the surgeon is not liable for honest error in judgment.
Minors lack capacity to grant consent to surgical operations.
Authorizations for minors should be reduced to writing, and
signed by the parents or the guardian of the minor.24 There have
been instances where a minor of understanding years has been
22 Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Calif. App. 2d 776, 208 P. 2d 68 (1949). And see
Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D. C. Mun. App., 1943).
"To accept this view (unauthorized operation) we would have to deny
that it was an emergency and declare a rule which would tend to make
every surgeon litigation-conscious instead of duty-conscious, as he stands,
scalpel in hand, over his unconscious patient. We hold the law to be that
in case of emergency a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his duty
to perform, such operation as good surgery demands even when it means
extending the operation further than was originally contemplated." And see
Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290
(1912);
Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 91, 237 N. W. 444, 76 A. L. R. 551 (1931).
"While the courts are not entirely in harmony upon the question of
consent to an operation, we think the better reasoning supports the proposi-
tion that, if a surgeon is confronted with an emergency which endangers
the life or health of the patient, it is his duty to do that which the occasion
demands within the usual and customary practice among physicians and
surgeons in the same or similar localities without the consent of the patient.
"Here, the seriousness of the condition of the boy whose elbow had been
crushed by an accident which does not seem to have been fully disclosed
until after he was placed under an anesthetic, along with the inability to
reach either parent is regarded as justifying the operation as an emergency
which called for immediate action."
2 "... . a surgeon may lavfully perform, and it is his duty to perform, such
operation as good surgery demands, in case of emergency, without the
consent of the patient."
Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912).
24 Wells v. McGehee, 39 S. 2d 196 (La., 1949);
Barfield v. S. Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 S. 30 (1915).
See also, Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12 (1956).
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held to possess capacity to consent to an operation.2 5 But the
better rule is: In the absence of emergency, the surgeon operates
on a minor at his peril without the parent's or guardian's consent.
When an emergency is present, and the parent or guardian is un-
available, the surgeon's duty is to do that which the occasion
demands in the best interests of the patient.
In summary, the surgeon operates at his own peril without
first obtaining consent of the patient or of some one legally au-
thorized to consent for him. In an emergency of unanticipated
situation this rule is qualified and the surgeon may operate with-
out consent. Caution, however, must not be abandoned. The
rule laid down in Mohr v. Williams, that no rule or principle of
law extends to the physician free license respecting surgical op-
erations, still remains a much quoted principle of law. The
physician should be always mindful that a consent is a privilege
extended to him in good faith, through which he can violate one
of the basic rights created in the common law. Any intentional
deceit, fraud, or unworthy motive perpetrated under the pro-
tective cloak of this privilege can be the basis of action in battery.
Those physicians who recognize and respect this privilege, and
exercise it in good faith with reasonable skill and care, will be
insulated from unjust liability.
25 Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N. W. 94, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 612 (1906).
Held that a father could not complain for an operation on his 17 year
old son for a tumor, when the operation was not of a very dangerous
character and there was nothing to indicate to the doctors, that the father
did not approve of his son's going with his aunt and adult sisters to consult
one of the doctors and following his advice.
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